How do institutional constraints affect judicial decision-making? The European Court of Justice's French language mandate

Sivaram Cheruvu*†

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Abstract

Under what conditions do the institutional features of courts affect the efficiency of judicial decision-making? Examining the Court of Justice of the European Union's mandate that all judgments be written in French, I argue that francophone judges – i.e. judges from France, French-speaking Belgium and Luxembourg – write judgments more efficiently than their non-francophone counterparts. Leveraging the institutional feature of the judge-rapporteur and using matching methods, I show that comparable cases with a francophone judge-rapporteur are a month shorter on average than cases with a non-francophone judge-rapporteur. This estimate is robust to scaling the judgments by their word counts. Although I show francophones write judgments with lower lexical diversity on average than non-francophones, existing empirical measures are limited in examining differences in judgment quality. These findings have implications for the efficient processing of cases at the Court of Justice and the potential consequences of adopting a *lingua franca* in the European Union.

*Department of Political Science, Emory University

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1 Introduction

What institutional features affect some judges over others? How do these features affect a court's efficiency and outputs? Judges should be equally equipped to adjudicate the legal questions coming before them, and institutional barriers preventing effective judging should not exist. In practice, whether courts achieve these ideals is an open question.

Scholars are concerned about the motivations and constraints on judges in their job performance. Judges, like workers in other industries, balance career concerns, reputation concerns, salary and leisure among other variables (e.g. Clark, Engst and Staton 2019; Epstein, Landes and Posner 2013; Ramseyer and Rasmusen 2003). Judges often weigh these factors against their caseload. As caseload pressures increase, a judge's time is more constrained and she is compelled to strategically allocate her time among the cases she is assigned to adjudicate. Additionally, scholars are interested in the relationship between individual judge characteristics – such as race (e.g. Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010; Kastellec 2013; Sen 2015) and gender (e.g. Arrington 2018; Boyd, Epstein and Martin 2010; Glynn and Sen 2015) – and judicial decision-making. Furthermore, scholars in the linguistic justice tradition examine linguistic heterogeneity and the implications of language inclusion – or exclusion – within institutions on the policymaking process (e.g. Gazzola 2016*b*; Liu and Baird 2012). How does the choice of a *lingua franca* in a multilingual society affect a court and its judges?

In this article, I examine the French language requirement's effect on the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).[1] As policymakers and scholars actively deliberate whether the EU's commitment to multilingualism is still viable, the CJEU is an institution using a lingua franca in its formal decision-making. The CJEU mandates that all judgments be written exclusively in French.

While the member states are equally represented on the court – each member state appoints one judge to the court – the judges' capacity to write law outside of their native languages is not a given. Although the difficulty of translating law is well documented, the difficulty of writing law in a different language has only recently received attention (McAuliffe 2011, 2013). If judges use legal reasoning in a different language and translate it into French, they may be more likely

[1]The CJEU is comprised of both the Court of Justice (CJ) and the General Court (GC). Unless otherwise specified, I use CJEU to refer to the CJ in this paper.

to write vague and confusing law. Clarity of EU policy (e.g. directives from the Commission and judgments from the Court) is a factor in member state (non)compliance with EU law (e.g. Falkner et al. 2005; Mastenbroek and Van Keulen 2006). Considering qualitative studies such as McAuliffe (2011, 2013) showing non-francophones have difficulty writing law in French, francophone judges on the CJEU – i.e. judges from France, Luxembourg, and French-speaking Belgium – may be writing higher quality judgments.

Quantitatively testing questions regarding individual judges at the CJEU requires disentangling the contributions of individual judges from the court's collegial decision-making process. As a *per curiam* and civil law court, the CJEU's internal politics are obfuscated by design. A CJEU feature available for leverage is the judge-rapporteur (JR) – judgment-writer – for a case. I find the court's case assignment to a francophone JR correlates with a 25 to 29 day reduction in case duration on average. This estimate is robust to scaling the duration of each case by the length of each judgment. However, francophone JR's judgments have a lower lexical diversity than non-francophone JR's judgments. These findings in conjunction imply that while francophone judges are more efficient in their judgment-writing, their judgment-writing may not be higher quality than non-francophones.

2 Multilingual Europe, monolingual Court

The European Union is committed to multilingualism. According to the European Parliament (EP), the European Strategy for Multilingualism has three objectives: "promoting mobility of the labor force in the Single Market, employability and growth in Europe; strengthening social cohesion, the integration of migrants, and intercultural dialogue; managing in an effective and inclusive way multilingual communication in a supranational democracy" (Gazzola 2016*a*: 7).

Existing scholarship from a variety of disciplines examines multilingualism from the philosophical perspective of linguistic justice (e.g. Bellier 2002; May 2011) as well as the costs and benefits of multilingualism in the EU and other contexts (e.g. Ginsburgh, Moreno-Ternero and Weber 2017; House 2003). These studies weigh the efficiency gains from changing the EU's multilingual regime to a trilingual (i.e. English, French and German) or monolingual regime (i.e., English) against the potential linguistic disenfranchisement of a large proportion of the EU population. For example, Gazzola (2016*a*) finds an English-only language policy would disenfranchise 45% to 79% of EU res-

idents, while a trilingual language policy would disenfranchise 26% to 49% of EU residents. Some scholars argue English already acts as a *de facto lingua franca* in Europe among individuals with different mother tongues and should be recognized by the EU as such (e.g. Ammon 2006; Seidlhofer 2001).

Despite the EUs official stance of multilingualism, CJEU judges write judgments exclusively in French. The court then translates these judgments into each member state's official language. The Commission estimates the EU's translation costs to be approximately 1 billion euros (European Commission 2013).

The historical reason for French as the CJEU's operating language may be *prima facie* obvious. The court was initially an institution of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, formed by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. With French an official language for half the countries, French was the natural choice for the ECSC. The ECSC treaty was explicit in Article 100 stating that it was "drawn up in a single original", meaning the document's French language text was the only authentic one and, thus, implying the organization's legal language was French.[2] As additional European institutions developed such as the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC), the CJEU's jurisdiction expanded beyond the ECSC to these other institutions.

While the treaties for Euratom and the EEC and eventually the EU all claimed the treaties' different language drafts had equal value, the CJEU was explicitly exempt from abiding by the European Council's language rules. Article 242 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states: "The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Union shall, *without prejudice to the provisions contained in the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union*, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously by means of regulations."

The continued exemption from the EU's language rules for the CJEU is both historical, as illustrated above, and practical. Carl Otto Lenz (1988), an Advocate-General (AG) at the court from 1984-1997, explains: "For historical reasons the Court's working language is French[...] As the Judges, Advocates General and their staff are not masters of all possible languages of cases and as the distribution of cases should not depend upon language, one language must be chosen

[2]See Currall (2010) for a more in-depth overview of this point.

as the common means of communication." As outlined comprehensively by Lenz (1988), selecting a common language for an institution – in particular a judicial institution – has many practical benefits. Nonetheless, using a single language entails costs as well.

3 How does the French language mandate affect the CJEU?

3.1 Speed and Efficiency

The increase in the case workload and backlog at the CJEU is a concern (e.g., Kenney 2000; Tridimas and Tridimas 2004). Unlike the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) that gained control over its docket over time and substantially limited the cases it heard in a given term, the CJEU hears all cases referred to it. In dealing with a heavy caseload, anything affording relief to judges on the court is valuable. While the majority of the law and economics literature on the relationship between judges' caseloads and court outputs studies the American common law context (e.g. Bainbridge and Gulati 2002; Epstein, Landes and Posner 2013), scholars are interested in the impact of large caseloads in civil law contexts as well (e.g. Bielen et al. 2018; Roussey and Soubeyran 2018). Figure 1 shows the average case duration for all JRs has increased over time with a slight drop in recent years.

Each judge at the CJEU has a "cabinet" made up of "référendaires" – similar to clerks at SCOTUS[3] – to assist with the judgment-writing process. The increasing caseload forces judges to be more reliant on their référendaires. Although many judges will hire at least one francophone référendaire to aid in the drafting process, Kenney (2000: 608) explains "at least one member of the cabinet is certain to be from the same member state as the [judge][...] Similarly, some [judges] may place a higher priority on in-depth knowledge of national law than on knowledge of EC law and French". While French proficiency is a requirement for all référendaires, this requirement does not guarantee native fluency. McAuliffe (2011: 102) details: "In spite of the fact that référendaires are required to work wholly in French they are not required to have a perfect command of that language. If a référendaire is not sufficiently competent in the French language, however, it can cause problems for the judge in whose cabinet he or she works". Furthermore, McAuliffe (2011:

[3]For a more detailed comparison of the role of CJEU référendaires to U.S Supreme Court clerks see Kenney (2000).

103) claims that although an effort is made to assign cases to référendaires based on expertise, in general cases are distributed "solely on the basis of workload".

Hypothesis 1 *Francophone judges work more quickly than non-francophone judges on substantively similar cases*

Adjudicating disputes is already a difficult and time-consuming task for judges. Providing an additional layer of difficulty – i.e. doing this time-consuming task in a different language – adds another constraint on the time of non-francophone judges. For francophone judges, this constraint does not exist. As a result, the amount of time francophone judges – and their référendaires – have to dedicate to cases in which they are the JR relative to their colleagues is attenuated by their superior facility with the French language.

3.2 Differences in judgment writing

Within the EU, the clarity of the European Commission's directives and the CJEU's judgments is one of the determinants of whether countries comply with them (e.g. Börzel 2000; Duina 1997; Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009). While vagueness is often conceptualized as a strategic decision by courts concerned with *ex post* compliance[4] (e.g. Staton and Vanberg 2008), not having native facility with a language can lead to vagueness on accident.

In the aforementioned translation process by non-francophone référendaires described by McAuliffe (2011, 2013), substantial room exists for imprecision and vagueness. Legal concepts in one language do not necessarily translate word for word into another language. Thus, any translation from one mode of legal reasoning into another is necessarily an *approximation*. From her qualitative interviews, McAuliffe (2013) states that all the référendaires and judges interviewed for her study claimed that the CJEU's judgments are shaped by the fact that the working language of the court is French. McAuliffe (2013: 98) further claims, "because French is rarely the mother tongue of

[4]As per the conceptualization of Fjelstul and Carrubba (2018), *ex post* compliance can be understood from the perspective of the European Commission as the joint probability of winning a case before the CJEU and the probability the member state complies with the CJEUs ruling. Staton and Vanberg (2008) argue that judges are more likely to issue vague rulings when there is considerable uncertainty over their policy outcomes in order to strategically mask potential member state non-compliance with their rulings from public view.



Figure 1: The average case duration per year by country judge-rapporteur for cases under 1,000 days. Over time, the average case duration for all judge-rapporteurs has substantially increased with a decline in the most recent years. The discontinuous breaks are periods in which a country's judge on the court served as the CJEU president. This increase is correlated with the court's increasing caseload as shown in figure **??**. Likewise, judges' time on the CJEU is increasingly constrained.

those drafting that case law, there is a tendency to repeat expressions and to cut and paste from previous case law or source documents. Together with the difficulties of manipulating a language that is not ones own, the result is often a stilted and awkward text."

Hypothesis 2 *Systematic differences exist between francophone judges' judgments and non-francophone judges' judgments*

Conditional on legal arguments not directly translating from one language to another and by not translating their legal reasoning, francophone judges' judgments are written exactly to their *intended* meaning and not their *approximate* meaning. Therefore francophone judges' judgments may more accurately reflect their preferences relative to those written by non-francophone judges and may be comparatively higher quality.

However, the literature on applied linguistics and second language learning may offer different predictions (e.g. Alexopoulou et al. 2017; Robinson 1995). For example, an experimental study (Kuiken and Vedder 2008) among university students studying French as a second language found that when assigned a relatively easier task and a relatively more complex task, fewer mistakes were made in the more complex task. Hamp-Lyons (1994) has similar findings and suggests that when faced with a cognitively more difficult task, those writing in a second-language are stimulated to put more effort into their writing.

If judges on the CJEU tend to have at least one francophone référendaire and if the cognitive complexity of writing a judgment pushes non-francophones to be more careful in their judgment writing, systematic differences may not exist in francophone judges' judgments versus non-francophones judges' judgments. Furthermore, if non-francophone judges are more cognitively deliberate in their judgment writing because of their non-native fluency with French, while not negatively impacting the quality of their judgment-writing, it may affect the speed of their judgment-writing and lend more credence to hypothesis 1.

4 Leveraging judge-rapporteur and chamber assignment

The CJEU is a *per curiam* court. For each case, judges write a single judgment as the decision of the court without dissent or concurrence. Although only one judgment is published for a given case,

unanimity is not required among the judges hearing the case. The CJEU's institutional features available for leverage are the JR and the assignment of judges to chambers.

When a case is lodged at the CJEU, the CJEU's president assigns the JR for the case. The JR is responsible for drafting the judgment of the case. Although the JR's assignment provides substantial insight into the judgment-writing of individual judges, it is not sufficient on its own to capture the collegial decision-making process of a chamber of judges.

In the CJEU, cases are heard by a panel (referred to within the CJEU as a "chamber") of judges. The judges on these chambers rotate periodically. As a result, the same composition of judges will hear a substantial number of cases together over a given period of time before the next rotation. Therefore, to make a reliable inference about the judgment-writing of an individual judge, the optimal research design would observe each chamber of judges and use the assignment of the JR to observe differences among the judges within the chamber.

The rotation of JR assignment within a chamber allows the leveraging of individual characteristics of judges themselves to observe differences in their performance, while controlling for the collegial decision-making process. Figure 2 provides two examples of the performance of individual JRs within a given chamber relative to the other judges in the chamber. In cases that are references for preliminary ruling (Article 267), francophone JRs had a shorter average case duration on both of these chambers than non-francophone JRs. Additionally, in both chambers in this figure the average case duration for francophone JRs is significantly shorter the mean.

5 Data and empirical strategy

To study the effect of the French language requirement on the CJEU, I use a dataset constructed by Fjelstul (2019) that includes all 10,767 judgments of the court from its founding to December 31, 2016. Each case in the dataset has the judge-rapporteur, chamber judges, advocate-general, start date, end date, filing language[5] and legal procedures coded.

[5]While all judgments at the court must be written in French, cases are submitted to the court in all of the official EU languages. According to the CJEU's website, "The language of the case is determined for each action before the Courts of the European Union. The language of the case is one of the 24 official languages. In preliminary ruling proceedings, the language is always that used by the national court or tribunal which made the reference. In direct actions, applicants



Figure 2: The average case duration (white dot) in order from least number of days to greatest number of days with 95 percent confidence intervals (solid vertical lines) within two different chambers when a judge is the judge-rapporteur. The x-axis demarcates the individual judge in each chamber and the member state by which the judge was appointed. The dotted line is the mean case duration for all Article 267 cases heard by the individual chamber. In both chambers francophone JRs have an average case duration less than non-francophone JRs.

I then proceeded to collect background information on each judge including where they received their legal education using the CJEU's website. I use this information to distinguish between French-speaking Belgians and Flemish-speaking Belgians, to identify if there were non-francophones who had their primary legal education in French[6] and to identify whether a judge in the dataset served as a judge in any capacity before coming to the CJEU. If a Belgian judge received her legal education in a French-speaking university she was coded as francophone, otherwise she was coded as non-francophone.

Problems exist with this strategy to identify francophones. First, even if these judges attended a French-speaking university, it is possible that their primary coursework was not in French. Second, language capacity is not dichotomous. Judges may have French fluency but do not originate from France, Belgium or Luxembourg. For example, Kenney (1998: 118) details, "Britain's first appointment as advocate general was Jean-Pierre Warner, an excellent choice because he was bilingual, born of a French mother and an English father". Without more fine grained data such as interviews with individual judges I cannot discern which judges have additional language background in French.

Out of the 96 judges within the sample, 16 are francophones.[7] Every Belgian judge except Mertens de Wilmars and Lenaerts is coded as francophone. Among judges not from France, Luxembourg or Belgium, only Lycourgos (Cyprus) received his primary legal education in France. Additionally, 55 judges previously served as a judge before coming to the court.[8]

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may choose the language of the case. They are not bound by their own nationality or by that of their lawyer. However, where the defendant is a Member State the language of the case is the language, or one of the languages, of that State[...] The Court needs a common language in which to conduct deliberations. That language is, by custom, French. Thus, all documents lodged by the parties in the language of the case are translated into French as part of the internal working file." Within these data, filing language is a string indicating the filing language of the case. For more information see: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_10739/en/

[6]There were judges in these data that did additional graduate education at a French-speaking university (e.g. Von Danowitz, Juhasz and Vilaras), but I did not count them in my coding.

[7]The francophone judges are Bonichot, Galmot, Grèvisse, Lecourt, Puissochet, Rueff, Touffait, Delvaux, Joliet, Wathelet, Biltgen, Hammes, Kasel, Pescatore, Schintgen and Schockweiler.

[8]I included judges that served as an AG on the court before becoming a judge in this count.



Figure 3: The percentage of cases heard by francophone and non-francophone judge-rapporteurs per year over the history of the court. As more countries joined the EU the gap widens, suggesting that cases were not systematically assigned more often to francophone judge-rapporteurs.

Out of 10767 cases, 1868 cases have a francophone JR. Figure 3 shows the percentage of cases heard by francophone JRs has stayed proportional to the percentage of francophone EU member states over time. Therefore, within these data, it does not appear that more cases were assigned to francophone judges versus non-francophone judges over time.

Furthermore, I obtained the French language texts of each case and calculated two different measures. The first is the raw word counts from every judgment. I divided the word counts of each case's judgment by its duration (defined as the number of days from a case's start date to its end date) in order to obtain a measure of a rate of production (measured in words per day). The intent of this procedure is to scale the case duration measure. By dividing word count by case duration, I am accounting for cases taking longer for the simple reason that the judgments are more complicated and require more deliberation. The second is a naive measure of lexical diversity calculated using the `quanteda` package in R after filtering out stop words and stem words.[9]

[9]Stop words are commonly used words in a language that are filtered out before processing a text because on their own they do not hold much informational value. For example, in French, stop words would include "le", "je" and "nous". Removing stem words or "stemming" involves reducing words to their stem so that they are not counted as different words. For example, in

A concern of quantitatively analyzing judgments is that it assumes that all cases are equal in magnitude and salience. To address this concern, I use fixed-effects for the judges sitting on a case in all my models and I take advantage of the legal issue coding in this dataset. Scholars argue the number of judges sitting on a chamber is a proxy for a cases' salience as more important cases tend to be assigned to larger chambers (e.g. Kelemen 2012; Larsson and Naurin 2016). Including chamber fixed-effects in my models addresses both heterogeneity in the collegial decision-making process of different chambers of judges and implicitly controls for the number of judges hearing a case.

The legal procedures coded in this dataset by TFEU article include appeals (Article 256), actions for failure to fulfill obligations (Article 258), actions for annulment (Article 263), actions for failure to act (Article 265), references for preliminary rulings (Article 267), applications for compensation based on non-contractual liability (Article 268) and staff cases (Article 270). Within these data, each legal procedure is a separate binary variable indicating whether the case falls under the legal procedure or not. This coding is valuable since it allows comparison among substantively similar cases. Figure 4 compares case assignment to francophone and non-francophone JRs by the Article 256, 258 and 265 legal procedures, which make up the vast majority cases. Similar to the trend in Figure 3, the number of cases by legal procedure assigned to francophone judges, with the exception of the earliest years of the court where only a few cases were adjudicated, is proportional to the percentage of francophone judges on the court over time.

The decision-making process at the CJEU is collegial. When a JR is assigned for a case, the chamber of judges to which the JR belongs is also assigned to the case. As a result, in order to make an inference about the judgment-writing of a JR, I must analyze the rotation of JR assignment within a chamber. This strategy provides an appropriate control case in which I can analyze the same chamber of judges on cases with substantively similar legal procedure and filing language and vary the assignment of the JR. Additionally, non-random assignment of cases to JRs may exist. For example, it is reasonable to expect that judges with more CJEU experience may be assigned harder cases. Although the increasing caseload of the CJEU and time constraints placed on the

French, the words "continu", "continua", "continuait", "continuant", "continuation", "continue" and "continué" are all reduced to their stem "continu".



Figure 4: The number of cases heard by Francophone and non-Francophone judge-rapporteurs per year by legal procedure. Similar to the trend in figure 3, the number of cases by legal procedure assigned to francophone judges seems proportional to the number of francophone judges on the court over time which addresses concerns to inference about selection effects in case assignment by legal procedure. The inconsistency in the earliest years of the court for Article 256 and Article 258 exists because few cases concerning those legal procedures were adjudicated.

president of the CJEU makes such strategic assignment of cases increasingly unlikely, it is plausible that certain judges specialized in different areas of legal procedure are more likely to be assigned certain types of cases. While strategically assigning cases to judges may provide an organizational benefit to the court, it could complicate statistical inference.

In order to adequately address these potential threats to inference, I use 1:1 exact matching to non-parametrically pre-process these data (Ho et al. 2007). After identifying all cases with a francophone JR (1865 cases), I matched these treated cases to control cases (cases with a non-francophone JR) that had the same chamber of judges. Out of the 8867 control observations, 3407 are included in the matched dataset. Additionally 1604 treated observations are matched to one or more control observations. I discard 5460 control observations and 261 treated observations resulting in a matched dataset of 5011 observations. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the word count, lexical diversity, and case duration variables in the matched dataset.

For example, in this dataset there are two cases – CELEX Numbers 61990CJ0097 (*Hansgeorg Lennartz v Finanzamt München III*) and 61990CJ0183 (*B. J. van Dalfsen and others v B. van Loon and T. Berendsen*) – that were both lodged in 1990, were in regards to Article 267 and were



Figure 5: Distribution of word counts, lexical diversity, and case duration within the matched dataset.

heard by Judges Kakouris, Kapteyn, Mancini, O'Higgins and Schockweiler. The only difference is that in the first case Judge O'Higgins, who is Irish and coded as a non-francophone judge, was the JR and in the second case Judge Schockweiler, who is Luxembourgish and coded as a francophone judge, was the JR. Additionally, both Judge O'Higgins and Judge Schockweiler had served on the court for seven years at the time of the cases.

In estimating rapporteur effects – in this case, the effect of a different judge on the chamber being assigned as the JR – the treatment effects are *the differences in case duration, rate of production, and lexical diversity depending on whether the case is assigned to a francophone judge-rapporteur or not.* As other research details, leveraging characteristics – such as race and gender (e.g. Boyd, Epstein and Martin 2010; Kastellec 2013; Sen 2015) or, as in this article, language capacity – that are not experimentally manipulable complicates the conceptualization of a causal effect. Despite this conceptual difficulty, I can still estimate the average treatment effect between substantively similar cases that are assigned to a francophone JR and a non-francophone JR.

5.1 Dependent Variables

5.1.1 Case duration

Theoretically, I expect that francophone judges work more quickly (defined here as shorter case duration) than non-francophone judges. More specifically, cases assigned to francophone JRs should be shorter than cases assigned to non-francophone JRs when controlling for the chamber of judges with which they are hearing cases.

5.1.2 Rate of production

In addition to showing that francophone judges work more quickly than their counterparts (which would be the implication if cases with francophone JRs had a shorter case duration), complicating the case duration variable is the rate of production measure. This measure is calculated by dividing the word count of each judgment by case duration. The rate of production measure (as well as the case duration measure) assumes that all judges face constraints on the time they can dedicate to a given case – e.g., leisure, weekends and caseload. It does not imply that judges are constantly working on their cases. If francophone judges have a substantively faster rate of production than non-francophone judges, it serves a robustness check for the case duration measure that further supplements that francophone judges at the court, *ceteris paribus*, are working more quickly than their non-francophone counterparts.

5.1.3 Lexical diversity

Lexical diversity is a measure for the number of unique words in a given corpus. These calculations are made using a ratio of tokens (number of total words) to types (number of unique words). While other research uses measures to examine the complexity of SCOTUS opinions and connect complexity with clarity (e.g. Owens and Wedeking 2011; Spriggs 1996), reasons exist to question the validity of these measures.[10] As a result, I opt for a simpler measure of lexical diversity that evaluates the extent of the lexicon used in different judgments. One of the problems of lexical diversity measures is that it is often inaccurate for texts of varying lengths. To overcome this

[10] Benoit, Munger and Spirling (2019) demonstrate that indexes such as the Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) score are not adequate measures to draw conclusions about political communication.

problem I use the Maas measure of lexical diversity (e.g. Covington and Mcfall 2010; McCarthy and Jarvis 2007, 2010). I use this measure to answer a simple question: are there *systematic* differences in the lexicon used by francophone and non-francophone judges in their judgments?

An obvious threat to inference using the aforementioned dependent variables is that they do not take into account the different writing styles of the judges. Some judges may prefer to be more verbose with their writing, while others may desire to be more succinct. These writing styles may also be a product of the legal traditions of their home member state. Furthermore, the quality of the judgments may vary based on when a member state joined the EU. For example, Kenney (1998: 121) explains, "Ireland's early appointments were neither well-schooled in EC law or French[...] In his farewell remarks, [Irish Judge] Ó'Dálaigh makes several references to his difficulty with both the French language and European Community law". To address these concerns, I use JR member state fixed-effects in the OLS models I estimate to control for unobserved heterogeneity in lexical diversity due to different legal traditions.

Similarly, another threat to inference is the role of the AG in the judgment-writing process. The AG of a case writes an opinion that advises the court on how the issue before the court should be resolved. The judgment written by the JR is often framed by the AG's opinion of the case. For this reason, the OLS models I estimate with lexical diversity as the dependent variable use AG fixed-effects to take into account the affect of the AG's opinion on the judgment at the court.

5.2 Empirical Strategy

I estimate the following three OLS models with standard errors clustered at the chamber-level on both the unmatched and matched (parametric OLS model with frequency weights) datasets with case duration and rate of production as the dependent variables. Formally the OLS models (where i indexes the case, c indexes the chamber, and t indexes year) are

$$CaseDuration_i = \beta \cdot Francophone_i + \delta X_i + \gamma Z_i + \psi_c + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{ic} \tag{1}$$

$$Rate of Production_i = \beta \cdot Francophone_i + \delta X_i + \gamma Z_i + \psi_c + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{ic} \tag{2}$$

Table 1: Models for Unmatched and Matched Data on Case Duration

	Dependent variable: Case Duration					
	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)
Francophone JR	-25.536^{***}	-25.100^{***}	-27.848^{***}	-27.963^{***}	-28.486^{***}	-29.203^{***}
	(4.681)	(4.493)	(4.712)	(4.361)	(4.545)	(4.010)
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	5,011	10,732	5,011	10,732	5,011
R^2	0.664	0.633	0.689	0.661	0.689	0.661

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

with $Francophone_i$ an indicator for whether the JR of the case is francophone, $\mathbf{X}_i$ a vector of case specific covariates (legal procedure and filing language), $\mathbf{Z}_i$ a vector of covariates specific to the JR (number of years on the CJEU and a dichotomous indicator of whether a CJEU judge served as a judge in their home member state), ψ_c the chamber fixed-effect, λ_t year fixed-effect and ϵ_{ic} a vector of case specific mean zero residuals clustered at the chamber level.

For the models with lexical diversity as the dependent variable, I add an advocate-general fixed-effect and a member-state fixed-effect. Formally the OLS model (where g indexes the AG and s indexes the member state) is

$$LexicalDiversity_i = \beta \cdot Francophone_i + \delta X_i + \gamma Z_i + \psi_c + \lambda_t + \alpha_g + \mu_s + \epsilon_{ic} \tag{3}$$

with α_g advocate general fixed-effect and μ_s member state fixed-effect.

For each regression model β is the treatment effect on average of assigning a case to a francophone JR. For case duration, a negative β would indicate that cases assigned to francophone JRs take less days on average than cases with non-francophone JRs. For rate of production a positive β would indicate that francophone JRs are writing more words per day than non-francophone JRs. Lastly, for lexical diversity, a positive β would indicate that francophone JRs are using a larger lexicon of words in their judgment-writing than non-francophone JRs.

6 Results

The results for all models can be found Tables 1 (case duration), 2 (rate of production) and 3 (lexical diversity). I reduced the tables to only include the coefficient on francophone JR for ease

Table 2: Models for Unmatched and Matched Data on Rate of Production

	Dependent variable: Rate of Production					
	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)
Francophone JR	0.492***	0.419***	0.508***	0.437***	0.398***	0.355***
	(0.098)	(0.091)	(0.101)	(0.090)	(0.107)	(0.103)
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	5,011	10,732	5,011	10,732	5,011
R^2	0.429	0.278	0.450	0.319	0.451	0.320

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

of presentation. See the online appendix for regression tables with the full coefficients. Additionally, I disaggregated the francophone judges and reran the matching process for JRs from France, Luxembourg and Belgium (heretofore "disaggregated models") with results in the online appendix.

6.1 Case duration

Consistent with hypothesis 1, the coefficient on case duration is in the expected direction (negative) with the effect on all models statistically significant ($p < .001$). Table 1 shows that cases with a francophone JR are 25 to 29 days shorter on average than cases with a non-francophone JR. These results are also robust to taking the natural log of case duration (see supplemental material). The results of the disaggregated models for case duration are all in the expected direction (negative) for each set of JRs and statistically significant for JRs from France and Luxembourg.

6.2 Rate of production

As shown in Table 2, the rate of production of francophone JRs is positive and statistically significant for all models. These results, in conjunction with the substantial difference in case duration, provide evidence for Hypothesis 1 that francophone judges work more quickly than non-francophone judges.

6.3 Lexical diversity

Table 3 shows that for all models the coefficient on Francophone JR is negative and statistically significant ($p < .05$). As described earlier, these results could be indicative of the difficulty of capturing lexical diversity on texts of differing lengths as texts with more words tend to score

Table 3: Models for Unmatched and Matched Data on Lexical Diversity

	Dependent variable: Lexical Diversity					
	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)
Francophone JR	−0.002*	−0.003*	−0.002**	−0.003**	−0.002**	−0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Member State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Advocate-General Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	5,011	10,732	5,011	10,732	5,011
R^2	0.405	0.293	0.473	0.398	0.473	0.399

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

lower on the lexical diversity scale. Furthermore, despite qualitative evidence (e.g. Kenney 1998; McAuliffe 2008, 2011) describing the difficulties faced by judges writing in French, the quantitative evidence suggests judgments written by non-francophone judges are not systematically lower quality than judgments written by francophone judges. While statistical significance in the negative direction implying that francophone judges have less lexical diversity may appear perplexing, the applied linguistics literature suggests that in conversations with non-native speakers native speakers should use simpler language in order to increase comprehension (e.g. Ellis and He 1999; Gass and Varonis 1984; Nakahama, Tyler and Van Lier 2001; Varonis and Gass 1985). This logic may extend to francophone judges perhaps using simpler language in their deliberations and subsequently their judgment-writing. At the very least, this result suggests that the judgment-writing of non-francophone judges may be on par with their francophone counterparts. These preliminary results invite future research on judgment-writing quality at the CJEU and the development of a measure on the quality of judgments.

7 Conclusion

In this article I provide evidence that the requirement that all CJEU judgments be written in French affects francophone and non-francophone judges. Cases assigned to francophone JRs are on average 25 to 29 days shorter than comparable cases assigned to non-francophone JRs, with results robust to scaling the duration of the judgments by their word counts (rate of production). However, judgments written by francophone judges score lower in lexical diversity than judgments

written by non-francophone judges. These findings imply that while francophone judges may be more efficient than non-francophone judges at the court, it remains an open question whether the quality of judgment-writing at the court is impaired by the French language mandate.

These results lend themselves to multiple policy recommendations for the EU with differing consequences. The shorter case duration for francophone JRs implies that if the CJEU allows judges to write in their member state's primary language (or any language of their choosing) the court will become more efficient in processing cases. The caseload at the CJEU is increasing over time. Allowing JRs to write judgments in their own language may substantially decrease the time to complete a case. These time-savings are substantial – as much as a month per case if the coefficient estimates from this study are accurate.

The consequence of adopting a multilingual policy is potentially sacrificing the collegiality of the decision-making process. For example, if the JR from Malta writes her judgments in Maltese it is exceedingly difficult for the judge from Poland to make recommendations on the wording of the judgment. The current French language requirement may already inhibit the participation of non-francophone judges at the court in the deliberation process, however it at least standardizes the language in which the judgments are written, saving judges the time of exploring the meaning of words written in judgments in another less common language.

Another policy option is to adopt an additional language for judgment-writing at the court such as English. While studies on the consequences of adopting English as the EU's *lingua franca* warn about the potential language disenfranchisement of EU citizens (Gazzola 2016*b*), the addition of another language for the CJEU may empower more judges to serve on the court. Judges that are not native French speakers would have the alternative of writing judgments in English. This bilingual language policy would expand the pool of judges from each country that could plausibly serve on the court. It also would not hamper the collegial decision-making process at the court in the same way as a policy allowing judges to write in any language. It is unclear, however, if this policy would lead to any efficiency gains for the court.

Furthermore, it is imperative for scholars to pursue quantitative research on language policy in institutions. A potential future research agenda could focus on courts in multilingual systems outside the EU such as Canada, Switzerland or India and analyze how the various different language policies affect the performance of the judges. Ideally, the choice of language should not constrain a

court or its judges. Inevitably, in multilingual societies, trade-offs are made between efficiency and linguistic access.

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Appendix A

In this Appendix I run robustness checks on my data to show that the results hold under various specifications and include the full regression tables from the paper (tables A.1, A.2 and A.3). Additionally, I disaggregate the pooled coding of JR Francophone. This appendix has 13 tables.

I reran the case duration analysis taking the natural log of the case duration variable. While the residuals seem to be normally distributed, their may be concerns that they are skewed in one direction or the other. After taking the natural log of the case duration variable, I find that the coefficient remains statistically significant and in the expected direction (negative) as shown in table A.4.

Within my primary analysis, I pooled all the francophone judges and estimated the effect when judges from France, Luxembourg, and (French) Belgium were coded as one. To show how the JRs from each member state compare individually to the other judges, I disaggregate this variable and rerun the analysis on JRs from each of these countries individually in tables A.5, A.6 and A.7 for French, tables A.8, A.9 and A.10 for Luxembourgish and tables A.11, A.12 and A.13 for French-Belgian judges.

I find that all the results are in the expected direction for case duration. The results are mixed for unmatched and matched specifications for lexical diversity. It does not change the substantive conclusions of the paper.

Codebook

CELEX_number	Unique case identifier in EurLex
case_number	Curia case number
year_case	Year case started
year_judgment	Year judgment rendered
date_case	Date case started
date_judgment	Date judgment rendered
language	String indicating filling language(s) of case
case_duration	Number of days between date_case and date_judgment
rate_of_production	Number of words in judgment divided by case_duration
Maas	Mass measure of lexical diversity
judges	Chamber of judges sitting on the case
judge_rapporteur	Judge-rapporteur (JR) for the case
JR_experience	Number of years JR has served on CJEU at the time of the case
JR_Country	Appointing country of JR for the case
JR_Any_Judge	Binary variable indicating if JR served as a judge before CJEU
JR_France	Binary variable indicating if JR appointed by France
JR_Belgium	Binary variable indicating if JR appointed by Belgium
JR_Belgium_French	Binary variable indicating if JR appointed by Belgium is Belgian-French
JR_Lux	Binary variable indicating if JR appointed by Luxembourg
JR_Francophone	Binary variable indicating if JR is francophone
AG_Country	Appointing country of Advocate General for the case
advocate_general	Advocate General for the case
art_256	Binary variable indicating if Article 256 case
art_258	Binary variable indicating if Article 258 case
art_263	Binary variable indicating if Article 263 case
art_265	Binary variable indicating if Article 265 case
art_267	Binary variable indicating if Article 267 case
art_268	Binary variable indicating if Article 268 case

art_270	Binary variable indicating if Article 270 case

Table A.1: Models for Unmatched and Matched Data on Case Duration

	Dependent variable:					
	Case Duration					
	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)
Francophone JR	−25.536***	−25.100***	−27.848***	−27.963***	−28.486***	−29.203***
	(4.681)	(4.493)	(4.712)	(4.361)	(4.545)	(4.010)
Article 256			−41.277	−53.999	−41.633	−54.997*
			(27.702)	(28.756)	(27.470)	(27.963)
Article 258			−116.162***	−117.892***	−116.369***	−118.850***
			(22.639)	(23.060)	(22.576)	(22.919)
Article 263			4.066	3.067	3.678	1.630
			(23.323)	(23.330)	(23.204)	(23.090)
Article 265			−23.333	−30.152	−23.508	−30.697
			(27.400)	(29.139)	(27.339)	(29.178)
Article 267			−125.581***	−123.092***	−125.858***	−124.149***
			(26.166)	(28.664)	(26.038)	(28.402)
Article 268			1.777	−1.047	1.437	−1.687
			(24.350)	(20.773)	(24.097)	(20.551)
Article 270			−16.322	−32.459	−16.547	−33.434
			(32.719)	(30.304)	(32.737)	(30.186)
Filing Language Croatian			37.142	8.692	37.411	8.831
			(23.132)	(23.635)	(22.753)	(23.122)
Filing Language Czech			−0.547	40.357	−0.163	41.035
			(27.255)	(37.274)	(27.496)	(37.156)
Filing Language Danish			46.125**	39.034	46.379**	39.868
			(16.725)	(20.793)	(16.847)	(20.907)
Filing Language Dutch			53.335**	28.394	53.517**	29.066
			(17.076)	(19.880)	(17.082)	(19.767)
Filing Language English			47.035**	23.596	47.053**	24.002
			(17.475)	(21.130)	(17.443)	(21.091)
Filing Language Estonian			101.508***	132.303	102.133***	134.026
			(28.756)	(69.697)	(29.008)	(69.933)
Filing Language Finnish			26.648	17.118	26.697	16.905
			(20.630)	(30.873)	(20.581)	(30.650)
Filing Language French			−15.926	−30.773	−15.783	−30.168
			(16.653)	(20.172)	(16.655)	(20.153)
Filing Language German			37.276*	19.888	37.345*	20.296
			(18.480)	(21.395)	(18.462)	(21.363)
Filing Language Greek			−1.947	−8.561	−1.962	−8.410
			(18.047)	(21.998)	(17.951)	(21.850)
Filing Language Hungarian			16.915	−2.210	16.890	−1.554
			(15.929)	(22.356)	(15.860)	(22.306)
Filing Language Italian			32.442	4.986	32.587	5.488
			(18.545)	(21.181)	(18.551)	(21.161)
Filing Language Latvian			−6.420	−27.756	−6.075	−27.906
			(32.497)	(63.942)	(32.727)	(64.336)
Filing Language Lithuanian			22.943	−23.800	22.951	−24.140
			(26.091)	(30.853)	(26.189)	(31.222)
Filing Language Maltese			115.295***		115.618***	
			(32.110)		(32.215)	
Filing Language Polish			67.280**	40.572	67.509**	41.034
			(21.753)	(37.011)	(21.594)	(36.810)
Filing Language Portuguese			34.250	26.214	34.396	26.727
			(18.443)	(24.245)	(18.566)	(24.187)
Filing Language Romanian			26.934	−12.815	27.471	−12.775
			(25.078)	(26.270)	(24.632)	(25.661)
Filing Language Slovak			87.169*	64.055	87.099*	65.858*
			(39.343)	(33.342)	(39.595)	(32.905)
Filing Language Slovenian			−34.350	11.623	−33.866	12.637
			(49.694)	(76.553)	(50.065)	(77.254)
Filing Language Spanish			39.531*	7.318	39.748*	7.758
			(16.689)	(19.889)	(16.795)	(19.985)
Filing Language Swedish			48.331*	30.339	48.403*	31.261
			(21.422)	(33.921)	(21.380)	(34.102)
JR CJEU Experience					0.129	0.595
					(0.451)	(0.460)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					−3.222	−4.386
					(5.015)	(6.863)
Constant	5,730.967***	6,396.171***	5,030.665***	5,614.885***	5,043.199***	5,645.751***
	(996.970)	(1,070.993)	(970.310)	(1,023.334)	(959.763)	(1,016.015)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	5,011	10,732	5,011	10,732	5,011
R^2	0.664	0.633	0.689	0.661	0.689	0.661

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

Table A.2: Models for Unmatched and Matched Data on Rate of Production

	Dependent variable:					
	Rate of Production					
	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)
Francophone JR	0.492***	0.419***	0.508***	0.437***	0.398***	0.355***
	(0.098)	(0.091)	(0.101)	(0.090)	(0.107)	(0.103)
Article 256			3.804***	3.231***	3.735***	3.145***
			(0.397)	(0.442)	(0.398)	(0.448)
Article 258			−0.657	−0.553	−0.695*	−0.620
			(0.367)	(0.369)	(0.354)	(0.374)
Article 263			0.871**	0.911**	0.805**	0.817**
			(0.272)	(0.280)	(0.268)	(0.293)
Article 265			−1.557**	−1.766**	−1.592*	−1.809**
			(0.601)	(0.644)	(0.622)	(0.669)
Article 267			1.234**	1.237**	1.187**	1.167**
			(0.378)	(0.413)	(0.370)	(0.411)
Article 268			−0.141	−0.112	−0.202	−0.160
			(0.258)	(0.357)	(0.253)	(0.361)
Article 270			−0.318	−0.220	−0.354	−0.290
			(0.470)	(0.493)	(0.457)	(0.494)
Filing Language Croatian			−4.016	−1.937	−3.943	−1.887
			(3.263)	(1.122)	(3.277)	(1.153)
Filing Language Czech			−2.809	−2.044	−2.737	−1.987
			(3.238)	(1.473)	(3.231)	(1.485)
Filing Language Danish			−2.216	−0.070	−2.170	−0.026
			(3.062)	(1.311)	(3.057)	(1.350)
Filing Language Dutch			−2.111	−0.049	−2.076	−0.012
			(3.155)	(1.281)	(3.154)	(1.320)
Filing Language English			−0.920	0.879	−0.913	0.905
			(3.118)	(1.259)	(3.122)	(1.290)
Filing Language Estonian			−4.799	−1.910	−4.692	−1.766
			(3.008)	(1.731)	(3.006)	(1.818)
Filing Language Finnish			−0.276	−0.502	−0.265	−0.518
			(3.656)	(1.174)	(3.655)	(1.196)
Filing Language French			−1.358	0.574	−1.330	0.610
			(3.049)	(1.394)	(3.051)	(1.428)
Filing Language German			−2.051	−0.023	−2.033	0.005
			(3.060)	(1.294)	(3.064)	(1.321)
Filing Language Greek			−1.618	0.342	−1.616	0.360
			(3.089)	(1.355)	(3.097)	(1.382)
Filing Language Hungarian			−0.687	2.909	−0.706	2.896
			(3.317)	(2.081)	(3.307)	(2.085)
Filing Language Italian			−2.033	0.271	−2.003	0.302
			(3.117)	(1.273)	(3.119)	(1.303)
Filing Language Latvian			−3.163	−2.153	−3.103	−2.165
			(3.136)	(1.604)	(3.131)	(1.629)
Filing Language Lithuanian			3.343	0.483	3.351	0.499
			(5.814)	(1.597)	(5.809)	(1.626)
Filing Language Maltese			−5.243		−5.204	
			(4.580)		(4.610)	
Filing Language Polish			−2.408	−0.758	−2.368	−0.713
			(3.158)	(1.164)	(3.158)	(1.198)
Filing Language Portuguese			−1.896	0.658	−1.878	0.677
			(3.134)	(1.290)	(3.133)	(1.326)
Filing Language Romanian			−3.384	−1.122	−3.279	−1.051
			(3.364)	(1.236)	(3.374)	(1.271)
Filing Language Slovak			−1.486	−0.805	−1.486	−0.688
			(3.068)	(1.440)	(3.070)	(1.497)
Filing Language Slovenian			1.497	−0.707	1.595	−0.595
			(4.826)	(1.979)	(4.835)	(2.009)
Filing Language Spanish			−2.045	0.534	−2.000	0.563
			(3.064)	(1.310)	(3.065)	(1.338)
Filing Language Swedish			−2.975	−1.039	−2.960	−0.988
			(3.031)	(1.270)	(3.039)	(1.306)
JR CJEU Experience					0.007	0.014
					(0.022)	(0.018)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					−0.643**	−0.422*
					(0.197)	(0.190)
Constant	92.893***	−23.755***	96.483***	−23.308***	98.412***	−21.867***
	(6.024)	(4.350)	(7.561)	(4.038)	(7.896)	(3.807)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	5,011	10,732	5,011	10,732	5,011
R^2	0.429	0.278	0.450	0.319	0.451	0.320

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

Table A.3: Models for Unmatched and Matched Data on Lexical Diversity

	Dependent variable:					
	Lexical Diversity					
	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)
Francophone JR	−0.002*	−0.003*	−0.002**	−0.003**	−0.002**	−0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Article 256			0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Article 258			0.010***	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Article 263			0.007***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Article 265			−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Article 267			0.013***	0.015***	0.013***	0.015***
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Article 268			−0.001	−0.0004	−0.001	−0.0003
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Article 270			0.001	0.003	0.001	0.003
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language Croatian			−0.016***	−0.016***	−0.016***	−0.016***
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Filing Language Czech			0.0003	0.003	0.0003	0.003
			(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Filing Language Danish			0.0001	−0.001	0.0001	−0.001
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language Dutch			0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language English			0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language Estonian			0.001	0.003	0.001	0.003
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Filing Language Finnish			0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language French			0.0001	0.001	0.0001	0.001
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language German			−0.0002	−0.0002	−0.0002	−0.0002
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language Greek			−0.001	−0.0001	−0.001	−0.0001
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language Hungarian			0.0001	0.00000	0.0001	−0.00001
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language Italian			−0.002**	−0.002	−0.002**	−0.002
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language Latvian			−0.001	−0.004	−0.001	−0.004
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language Lithuanian			0.001	0.005	0.001	0.005
			(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Filing Language Maltese			−0.001		−0.001	
			(0.002)		(0.002)	
Filing Language Polish			0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language Portuguese			−0.0004	0.001	−0.0004	0.001
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language Romanian			−0.003*	−0.003	−0.003*	−0.003
			(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Filing Language Slovak			0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002
			(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Filing Language Slovenian			0.001	0.00002	0.001	0.0001
			(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Filing Language Spanish			−0.001	0.0001	−0.001	0.0002
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Filing Language Swedish			−0.0003	−0.002	−0.0003	−0.002
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
JR CJEU Experience					−0.00004	−0.0001
					(0.00003)	(0.00005)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					−0.00000	0.0001
					(0.0002)	(0.0003)
Constant	0.197***	0.187***	0.229***	0.222***	0.228***	0.220***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Member State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Advocate-General Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	5,011	10,732	5,011	10,732	5,011
R^2	0.405	0.293	0.473	0.398	0.473	0.399

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

Table A.4: Models for Unmatched and Matched Data on Log Case Duration

	Dependent variable:					
	Log Case Duration					
	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)
Francophone JR	−0.026**	−0.026**	−0.031***	−0.032***	−0.032***	−0.035***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Article 256			−0.038	−0.028	−0.039	−0.030
			(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.040)
Article 258			−0.179***	−0.165***	−0.180***	−0.167***
			(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.038)
Article 263			0.036	0.051	0.036	0.048
			(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.038)
Article 265			−0.019	−0.009	−0.019	−0.010
			(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Article 267			−0.168***	−0.149***	−0.168***	−0.151***
			(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.037)
Article 268			0.105***	0.107**	0.104***	0.106**
			(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.033)
Article 270			0.080*	0.072	0.080*	0.069
			(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.042)
Filing Language Croatian			0.042	−0.036	0.043	−0.035
			(0.302)	(0.298)	(0.302)	(0.298)
Filing Language Czech			−0.014	0.066	−0.013	0.068
			(0.057)	(0.100)	(0.057)	(0.100)
Filing Language Danish			0.111*	0.061	0.111*	0.063
			(0.045)	(0.073)	(0.045)	(0.073)
Filing Language Dutch			0.104**	0.024	0.105**	0.026
			(0.039)	(0.067)	(0.039)	(0.067)
Filing Language English			0.084*	0.015	0.085*	0.016
			(0.039)	(0.067)	(0.039)	(0.067)
Filing Language Estonian			0.213**	0.224	0.214**	0.229
			(0.073)	(0.153)	(0.073)	(0.153)
Filing Language Finnish			0.052	0.050	0.052	0.050
			(0.048)	(0.079)	(0.048)	(0.079)
Filing Language French			−0.031	−0.089	−0.031	−0.088
			(0.039)	(0.067)	(0.039)	(0.067)
Filing Language German			0.081*	0.018	0.081*	0.019
			(0.038)	(0.066)	(0.038)	(0.066)
Filing Language Greek			0.014	−0.036	0.014	−0.036
			(0.042)	(0.071)	(0.042)	(0.071)
Filing Language Hungarian			0.029	−0.056	0.029	−0.056
			(0.050)	(0.092)	(0.050)	(0.092)
Filing Language Italian			0.078*	−0.004	0.079*	−0.003
			(0.039)	(0.067)	(0.039)	(0.067)
Filing Language Latvian			0.012	−0.069	0.013	−0.069
			(0.059)	(0.108)	(0.059)	(0.108)
Filing Language Lithuanian			0.029	−0.048	0.029	−0.048
			(0.066)	(0.118)	(0.066)	(0.118)
Filing Language Maltese			0.247		0.247	
			(0.172)		(0.172)	
Filing Language Polish			0.156***	0.065	0.157***	0.066
			(0.047)	(0.082)	(0.047)	(0.082)
Filing Language Portuguese			0.083	0.045	0.083	0.046
			(0.044)	(0.074)	(0.044)	(0.074)
Filing Language Romanian			0.061	−0.028	0.062	−0.027
			(0.059)	(0.102)	(0.059)	(0.102)
Filing Language Slovak			0.184*	0.114	0.184*	0.118
			(0.080)	(0.140)	(0.080)	(0.140)
Filing Language Slovenian			−0.171*	−0.051	−0.170*	−0.048
			(0.082)	(0.132)	(0.082)	(0.132)
Filing Language Spanish			0.086*	−0.005	0.087*	−0.004
			(0.041)	(0.069)	(0.041)	(0.069)
Filing Language Swedish			0.080	0.050	0.080	0.052
			(0.046)	(0.078)	(0.046)	(0.078)
JR CJEU Experience					−0.0001	0.001
					(0.001)	(0.001)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					−0.007	−0.012
					(0.007)	(0.009)
Constant	14.057***	16.337***	12.690***	14.822***	12.705***	14.877***
	(0.576)	(0.540)	(0.562)	(0.536)	(0.563)	(0.538)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,731	5,010	10,731	5,010	10,731	5,010
R^2	0.686	0.689	0.712	0.716	0.712	0.717

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

Table A.5: Models for France Judge-Rapporteur on Case Duration

	Dependent variable:					
	case_duration					
	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)
France JR	−18.386*	−16.576	−21.910*	−22.008**	−22.025*	−20.212**
	(9.026)	(8.473)	(8.507)	(7.264)	(9.043)	(7.838)
Article 256			−42.099	−38.366	−42.021	−39.238
			(28.128)	(44.045)	(27.775)	(44.108)
Article 258			−116.073***	−66.503	−116.027***	−66.340
			(23.059)	(37.754)	(22.897)	(37.846)
Article 263			3.372	35.550	3.490	35.993
			(23.784)	(39.221)	(23.550)	(39.298)
Article 265			−23.606	6.470	−23.550	5.057
			(27.280)	(37.416)	(27.164)	(35.977)
Article 267			−126.345***	−91.074	−126.261***	−90.987*
			(26.654)	(46.474)	(26.386)	(46.406)
Article 268			2.334	32.460	2.421	32.046
			(24.842)	(28.330)	(24.546)	(28.003)
Article 270			−17.123	−7.535	−17.042	−6.922
			(32.739)	(60.427)	(32.561)	(60.209)
Filing Language Croatian			34.528	−2.182	34.652	1.409
			(23.715)	(31.875)	(23.550)	(30.677)
Filing Language Czech			−0.778	24.683	−0.880	27.492
			(27.583)	(42.761)	(27.871)	(41.272)
Filing Language Danish			45.625**	2.061	45.541**	3.566
			(16.715)	(38.361)	(16.882)	(38.851)
Filing Language Dutch			53.609**	7.089	53.553**	8.902
			(17.174)	(30.119)	(17.213)	(30.021)
Filing Language English			47.352**	30.308	47.351**	32.458
			(17.399)	(35.278)	(17.406)	(35.313)
Filing Language Estonian			100.358***	93.407	100.181***	98.259
			(28.842)	(109.676)	(29.298)	(110.656)
Filing Language Finnish			26.796	25.126	26.789	27.334
			(20.828)	(39.016)	(20.844)	(38.328)
Filing Language French			−15.622	−47.717	−15.669	−45.524
			(16.615)	(31.020)	(16.686)	(30.999)
Filing Language German			36.627*	9.386	36.620*	11.956
			(18.518)	(29.481)	(18.562)	(29.044)
Filing Language Greek			−2.489	−20.672	−2.473	−18.059
			(18.065)	(41.426)	(18.081)	(41.314)
Filing Language Hungarian			16.709	−30.461	16.662	−28.925
			(16.000)	(31.590)	(15.972)	(30.503)
Filing Language Italian			31.897	−5.554	31.864	−3.322
			(18.611)	(31.806)	(18.707)	(31.757)
Filing Language Latvian			−6.425	−23.205	−6.546	−21.197
			(32.770)	(51.449)	(33.029)	(51.447)
Filing Language Lithuanian			23.521	−35.534	23.520	−32.121
			(25.792)	(35.903)	(25.827)	(34.789)
Filing Language Maltese			115.130***		114.977***	
			(32.046)		(32.312)	
Filing Language Polish			66.429**	42.214	66.367**	44.432
			(21.746)	(41.710)	(21.681)	(42.078)
Filing Language Portuguese			34.478	25.626	34.405	26.768
			(18.242)	(36.412)	(18.396)	(35.785)
Filing Language Romanian			26.645	−23.502	26.522	−16.611
			(25.305)	(29.719)	(24.897)	(28.710)
Filing Language Slovak			87.158*	55.983	87.217*	60.469
			(39.458)	(51.373)	(39.379)	(51.146)
Filing Language Slovenian			−35.409	−64.796	−35.485	−56.693
			(48.572)	(40.603)	(48.809)	(41.229)
Filing Language Spanish			38.976*	13.668	38.930*	15.407
			(16.792)	(32.388)	(16.920)	(32.192)
Filing Language Swedish			48.592*	33.441	48.577*	36.337
			(21.401)	(42.171)	(21.470)	(42.257)
JR CJEU Experience					−0.086	−1.187*
					(0.468)	(0.563)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					0.729	−8.321
					(5.202)	(7.171)
Constant	5,751.746***	8,017.899***	5,057.409***	7,257.004***	5,052.812***	7,227.306***
	(1,004.166)	(448.688)	(978.311)	(480.737)	(966.596)	(472.045)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	2,568	10,732	2,568	10,732	2,568
R^2	0.663	0.674	0.688	0.704	0.688	0.704

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

Table A.6: Models for France Judge-Rapporteur on Rate of Production

	Dependent variable:					
	Rate of Production					
	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)	(Unmatched)	(Matched)
Francophone JR	−0.267	−0.242	−0.160	−0.128	−0.036	−0.035
	(0.195)	(0.193)	(0.171)	(0.176)	(0.164)	(0.185)
Article 256			3.790***	2.162**	3.724***	2.091**
			(0.398)	(0.696)	(0.400)	(0.692)
Article 258			−0.681	−1.463*	−0.713*	−1.522**
			(0.366)	(0.584)	(0.352)	(0.577)
Article 263			0.865**	−0.128	0.797**	−0.271
			(0.277)	(0.614)	(0.272)	(0.615)
Article 265			−1.518*	−1.757	−1.570*	−1.821
			(0.608)	(0.902)	(0.632)	(0.969)
Article 267			1.232**	0.500	1.184**	0.416
			(0.378)	(0.734)	(0.370)	(0.727)
Article 268			−0.166	−0.767	−0.223	−0.779
			(0.269)	(0.439)	(0.258)	(0.432)
Article 270			−0.312	−1.279	−0.352	−1.395
			(0.471)	(0.845)	(0.458)	(0.868)
Filing Language Croatian			−3.745	−1.157	−3.769	−1.168
			(3.267)	(1.419)	(3.285)	(1.441)
Filing Language Czech			−2.812	−3.369*	−2.733	−3.219*
			(3.241)	(1.559)	(3.234)	(1.584)
Filing Language Danish			−2.236	0.632	−2.178	0.755
			(3.073)	(1.510)	(3.065)	(1.569)
Filing Language Dutch			−2.138	0.527	−2.090	0.660
			(3.159)	(1.536)	(3.157)	(1.599)
Filing Language English			−0.939	1.534	−0.925	1.618
			(3.121)	(1.548)	(3.125)	(1.602)
Filing Language Estonian			−4.755	−0.892	−4.653	−0.644
			(3.006)	(2.194)	(3.005)	(2.258)
Filing Language Finnish			−0.277	−0.315	−0.266	−0.315
			(3.663)	(1.388)	(3.659)	(1.416)
Filing Language French			−1.390	1.283	−1.348	1.430
			(3.053)	(1.765)	(3.053)	(1.837)
Filing Language German			−2.054	0.312	−2.033	0.430
			(3.065)	(1.520)	(3.068)	(1.573)
Filing Language Greek			−1.624	1.239	−1.618	1.312
			(3.093)	(1.775)	(3.099)	(1.818)
Filing Language Hungarian			−0.706	1.007	−0.716	1.095
			(3.324)	(1.512)	(3.312)	(1.513)
Filing Language Italian			−2.033	0.857	−2.000	0.955
			(3.121)	(1.588)	(3.122)	(1.633)
Filing Language Latvian			−3.198	−0.387	−3.119	−0.237
			(3.141)	(1.931)	(3.134)	(1.988)
Filing Language Lithuanian			3.305	0.694	3.326	0.707
			(5.813)	(1.907)	(5.807)	(1.942)
Filing Language Maltese			−5.253		−5.203	
			(4.588)		(4.618)	
Filing Language Polish			−2.390	−0.321	−2.352	−0.219
			(3.162)	(1.877)	(3.162)	(1.919)
Filing Language Portuguese			−1.913	1.544	−1.886	1.637
			(3.138)	(1.738)	(3.136)	(1.776)
Filing Language Romanian			−3.378	0.006	−3.267	0.009
			(3.376)	(1.648)	(3.383)	(1.674)
Filing Language Slovak			−1.484	−1.044	−1.487	−0.798
			(3.071)	(1.619)	(3.072)	(1.728)
Filing Language Slovenian			1.562	−2.115	1.643	−1.872
			(4.819)	(2.382)	(4.832)	(2.445)
Filing Language Spanish			−2.043	1.196	−1.996	1.268
			(3.067)	(1.617)	(3.067)	(1.655)
Filing Language Swedish			−2.982	−0.957	−2.964	−0.844
			(3.039)	(1.677)	(3.045)	(1.698)
JR CJEU Experience					0.010	0.050*
					(0.021)	(0.025)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					−0.680***	−0.543
					(0.191)	(0.308)
Constant	92.932***	−36.200***	96.308***	−31.595***	98.439***	−28.943***
	(5.882)	(5.959)	(7.495)	(5.619)	(7.854)	(5.938)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	2,568	10,732	2,568	10,732	2,568
R^2	0.429	0.261	0.450	0.294	0.451	0.297

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

Table A.7: Models for France Judge-Rapporteur on Lexical Diversity

	Dependent variable: Lexical Diversity					
	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched
France JR	−0.00005	0.003	0.0001	0.003	0.00000	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 256			0.013***	0.010***	0.013***	0.010***
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 258			0.010***	0.007***	0.010***	0.007***
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 263			0.008***	0.005***	0.008***	0.005***
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Article 265			−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 267			0.013***	0.012***	0.013***	0.012***
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 268			−0.001	−0.002	−0.001	−0.002
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Article 270			0.001	−0.0003	0.001	−0.0003
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
JR CJEU Experience					−0.0001*	−0.00005
					(0.00003)	(0.0001)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					0.0001	0.00003
					(0.0002)	(0.0004)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Member State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Advocate-General Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	2,568	10,732	2,568	10,732	2,568
R^2	0.387	0.246	0.462	0.375	0.462	0.375

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

Table A.8: Models for Luxembourg Judge-Rapporteur on Case Duration

	Dependent variable: Case Duration					
	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched
Luxembourg JR	−31.052***	−25.869***	−31.481***	−24.798**	−32.118***	−26.015**
	(7.902)	(7.269)	(8.809)	(7.818)	(9.382)	(8.816)
Article 256			−41.558	−5.985	−41.846	−6.314
			(27.246)	(36.250)	(26.910)	(35.163)
Article 258			−115.956***	−98.179***	−116.111***	−99.182***
			(22.284)	(28.428)	(22.145)	(27.898)
Article 263			3.802	14.645	3.523	13.184
			(23.087)	(29.626)	(22.850)	(29.444)
Article 265			−25.764	−10.961	−25.950	−11.333
			(26.646)	(35.984)	(26.547)	(36.816)
Article 267			−125.897***	−90.736***	−126.099***	−91.701***
			(25.828)	(26.923)	(25.590)	(26.899)
Article 268			2.625	−10.512	2.389	−10.993
			(24.069)	(22.110)	(23.741)	(21.956)
Article 270			−16.474	23.114	−16.624	22.870
			(32.340)	(39.569)	(32.249)	(39.462)
JR CJEU Experience					0.038	1.147*
					(0.435)	(0.576)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					−2.597	0.127
					(5.445)	(9.380)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	2,741	10,732	2,741	10,732	2,741
R^2	0.664	0.706	0.688	0.729	0.688	0.729

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

Table A.9: Models for Luxembourg Judge-Rapporteur on Rate of Production

	Dependent variable: Rate of Production					
	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched
Luxembourg JR	0.969***	0.787***	1.023***	0.784***	0.874***	0.660***
	(0.165)	(0.128)	(0.183)	(0.148)	(0.167)	(0.124)
Article 256			3.817***	3.741***	3.749***	3.641***
			(0.387)	(0.742)	(0.390)	(0.720)
Article 258			−0.650	−0.125	−0.687*	−0.231
			(0.362)	(0.624)	(0.350)	(0.625)
Article 263			0.879**	1.265**	0.815**	1.134*
			(0.275)	(0.464)	(0.270)	(0.466)
Article 265			−1.500*	−2.441***	−1.545*	−2.527***
			(0.586)	(0.711)	(0.609)	(0.735)
Article 267			1.243***	1.420*	1.196**	1.336*
			(0.377)	(0.573)	(0.369)	(0.573)
Article 268			−0.153	0.205	−0.208	0.143
			(0.257)	(0.521)	(0.250)	(0.524)
Article 270			−0.320	0.307	−0.355	0.228
			(0.465)	(0.651)	(0.453)	(0.626)
JR CJEU Experience					0.006	0.036
					(0.021)	(0.022)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					−0.622***	−0.363
					(0.189)	(0.200)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	2,741	10,732	2,741	10,732	2,741
R^2	0.430	0.285	0.451	0.342	0.452	0.344

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

Table A.10: Models for Luxembourg Judge-Rapporteur on Lexical Diversity

	Dependent variable: Lexical Diversity					
	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched
Luxembourg JR	0.001*	−0.001	0.001*	−0.002	0.001*	−0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Article 256			0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
			(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Article 258			0.010***	0.011***	0.010***	0.011***
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 263			0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 265			−0.002	−0.001	−0.002	−0.001
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 267			0.013***	0.016***	0.013***	0.016***
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 268			−0.001	0.0001	−0.001	0.0001
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 270			0.001	0.005*	0.001	0.005*
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
JR CJEU Experience					−0.0001*	−0.0002*
					(0.00003)	(0.0001)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					0.0001	0.0004
					(0.0002)	(0.0004)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Member State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Advocate-General Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	2,741	10,732	2,741	10,732	2,741
R^2	0.387	0.284	0.462	0.411	0.462	0.413

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

Table A.11: Models for Belgium-French Judge-Rapporteur on Case Duration

	Dependent variable: Case Duration					
	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched
Belgium-French JR	−11.953	−10.695	−14.179	−17.296	−15.003	−20.893
	(11.282)	(10.823)	(11.121)	(11.501)	(10.811)	(14.877)
Article 256			−40.117	62.541	−40.232	62.691
			(27.364)	(45.384)	(27.187)	(45.655)
Article 258			−114.789***	−80.684*	−114.837***	−80.863*
			(22.626)	(32.069)	(22.561)	(31.942)
Article 263			4.659	68.770	4.588	68.399
			(23.384)	(48.316)	(23.297)	(47.803)
Article 265			−24.585	−19.483	−24.671	−20.615
			(27.201)	(33.315)	(27.111)	(32.294)
Article 267			−125.143***	−37.132	−125.187***	−37.338
			(26.143)	(43.294)	(26.015)	(43.054)
Article 268			2.810	50.755*	2.698	51.189*
			(24.989)	(25.399)	(24.733)	(25.590)
Article 270			−16.492	−14.966	−16.514	−15.447
			(32.356)	(59.696)	(32.304)	(59.360)
JR CJEU Experience					−0.091	0.200
					(0.480)	(1.348)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					−1.651	−5.901
					(4.941)	(17.007)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	1,227	10,732	1,227	10,732	1,227
R^2	0.663	0.606	0.688	0.648	0.688	0.648

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

Table A.12: Models for Belgium-French Judge-Rapporteur on Rate of Production

	Dependent variable: Rate of Production					
	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched
Belgium-French JR	0.607*	0.596**	0.353	0.445*	−0.046	0.448
	(0.245)	(0.222)	(0.198)	(0.194)	(0.239)	(0.230)
Article 256			3.777***	1.086	3.728***	1.081
			(0.396)	(1.292)	(0.397)	(1.296)
Article 258			−0.685	−2.653*	−0.710*	−2.651*
			(0.364)	(1.331)	(0.351)	(1.332)
Article 263			0.856**	−0.547	0.800**	−0.550
			(0.273)	(1.026)	(0.269)	(1.031)
Article 265			−1.536*	−1.927	−1.571*	−1.932
			(0.608)	(1.429)	(0.629)	(1.436)
Article 267			1.222**	−0.525	1.186**	−0.525
			(0.374)	(1.294)	(0.369)	(1.296)
Article 268			−0.160	−1.079	−0.223	−1.078
			(0.268)	(0.608)	(0.258)	(0.611)
Article 270			−0.317	−1.601	−0.350	−1.609
			(0.470)	(1.349)	(0.457)	(1.354)
JR CJEU Experience					0.010	−0.008
					(0.022)	(0.018)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					−0.686***	−0.011
					(0.202)	(0.164)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	1,227	10,732	1,227	10,732	1,227
R^2	0.429	0.379	0.450	0.437	0.451	0.437

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.

Table A.13: Models for Belgium-French Judge-Rapporteur on Lexical Diversity

	Dependent variable: Lexical Diversity					
	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched	Unmatched	Matched
Belgium-French JR	−0.002*	0.003***	−0.003**	0.002*	−0.002**	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Article 256			0.013***	0.007***	0.013***	0.007***
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 258			0.010***	0.006**	0.010***	0.006**
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 263			0.008***	0.005**	0.008***	0.005*
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 265			−0.002	−0.0003	−0.002	−0.0002
			(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Article 267			0.013***	0.011***	0.013***	0.011***
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 268			−0.001	−0.0004	−0.001	−0.0004
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Article 270			0.001	−0.002	0.001	−0.002
			(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.004)
JR CJEU Experience					−0.0001*	−0.0001
					(0.00003)	(0.0001)
JR Previous Judicial Experience					−0.00001	0.001
					(0.0002)	(0.001)
Chamber Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Member State Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Advocate-General Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge Personal Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,732	1,227	10,732	1,227	10,732	1,227
R^2	0.387	0.296	0.462	0.405	0.463	0.406

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the chamber-level are in parentheses.